

John Austin's Theory of Speech Acts

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Annotation: In England, in the middle of the 20th century, linguistic philosophy appears, which is one of the areas of analytical philosophy. Its main goal is to learn the common language. It was at this time that a phased departure from the philosophy of logical analysis took place, and the goals and methods of linguistic philosophy were rethought.

Keywords: Austin, philosophy, linguistics, analytical philosophy, theory.

Introduction

John Austin's Theory of Speech Acts is a descriptive-analytical linguistic theory from which it follows that our speech is a coordination of speech generation and goal setting, which can be depicted as a process.

This theory arose as part of analytical philosophy and is a key component of linguistic pragmatics.

Analytic philosophy is a channel of Anglo-American thought, the hallmark of which was an anti-metaphysical orientation and the desire for logical accuracy, as well as linguistic transparency in the formulation of problems and their solutions. Analytical philosophy includes two currents: the philosophy of logical analysis and the philosophy of linguistic analysis. The first is characterized by a scientific approach and a clear separation of the sphere of generally accepted concepts from scientific ones, and the reliability indicator is the validity and fulfillment of strict requirements. The philosophy of linguistic analysis, on the contrary, believes that truth lies in real life experience and is expressed in the ordinary use of the word. It is for this reason that the supporters of this trend believe that the main task of philosophy is to clarify and clarify the statements of ordinary language. British philosopher John Austin [1] belonged to the second direction.

Main Part

John Austin argued that the main task of philosophy is the clarification of the expressions of ordinary language, which also involves the analysis of its misuse.

In his lectures "How to do things with words" [2], Austin says that the idea that a "statement" can only "describe" a situation or state something about a fact, which must necessarily be true or false - delusion.

According to the philosopher, sensations can be deceiving, and for this reason they cannot be fully trusted. He carefully studied the phenomena of "reality" and "illusory" on the model of everyday speech, studied in detail the system of using such words as "appear", "seem", "look" - and concluded that the "reality" and "illusoryness" of an object changes in meaning based on context. Austin's conclusion: the problem is not in the reliability or fallacy of sensory perceptions, but in the meaningfulness or incomprehensibility of speech definitions. The discovery of the set of words to which Austin gave the name "performatives" played a very important role in the study.

Performative. A performative is a judgment equal to an action. John Austin noticed that if the verbs are in the form of the first person singular, then they cancel the function of the truth or falsity of the statement and become reality themselves. In everyday speech, language is used as a tool for performing various actions: greeting, apology, giving orders, making promises, etc. When a person says these phrases, he does not describe the action, but performs it.[1] That is, the expression "I promise you" is a performative, and the phrase "He promised him" is a constative.

The work on the study of the types of "statement" prompted John Austin to create a theory of speech acts.

By the mid-1950s, John Austin formulated the theory of speech acts, in which he argued that the unit of communication is no longer a statement, but a speech act, which is associated with the expression of a statement, question, explanation, description, etc., and is implemented according to generally accepted principles and rules of conduct. The object of the study was the act of speech, which was pronounced in a situation of direct communication with the interlocutor.

Austin refuses to divide statements into performatives and constatives, because he realized that any judgment has an active nature. To replace this idea, the philosopher creates a more thoughtful linguistic classification and designates three levels in it: locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary.

locutionary level. "Locutionary level" (Latin locutio - "speaking") - the pronunciation of a phrase, which includes the production of sounds, the use of words, and the establishment of a connection between them according to the rules of grammar, as well as the meaning.

illocutionary level. "Illocutionary level" (lat. in locutio) - denotes the communicative purpose of the statement, that for which it is pronounced. It might seem that locutionary acts coincide with stating statements, and illocutionary acts with performative ones. But Austin argues that it is impossible to classify a particular utterance as uniquely performative or ascertaining.

During a conversation, people at the same time perform an action that has some extralinguistic purpose. People speak not for the very process of pronouncing words and enjoying sounds, but for the sake of making sentences that will reflect the situation that is happening in the world.

Austin sought to systematize the characteristics of an illocutionary speech act and believed that for this it was necessary to discover all the verbs that describe the actions created during a conversation and can help assess the power of an utterance, that is, illocutionary.[3]

After studying the dictionary, Austin developed "use classes" of illocutionary verbs according to their illocutionary force:

- verdicts, any judgments, decisions
- exercitives, expression of influence, manifestation of power,
- commissions, promises, obligations and intentions
- behaviors, attitudes of social

- exposures, results of discussions, evidence, clarification of reasons

“Perlocutionary level” (lat. per locutio) is a combination of additional means of expression that exert a conscious influence on the addressee in order to achieve the desired result [4, 5, 6].

Conclusion

With the help of speaking, people can achieve certain results, make changes in the world around them and in the minds of their interlocutor, while the resulting outcome may either correspond to the original goal of the speaker or not. A speech act acts as a perlocutionary act if it is considered in the aspect of its real consequences.

It is important that all three levels can appear simultaneously in one sentence, that is, when a locutionary act is performed, the speaker at the same time performs an illocutionary act when he asks a question, answers it, expresses his opinion or informs about something. John Austin defines their differences for methodological purposes only. A distinctive feature of illocutionary acts from perlocutionary acts lies in the degree of influence on the listener. If the illocutionary act is limited to a warning or an order, then the perlocutionary act may include: threats, persuasion, persuasion, coercion, etc. [1]

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